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1. Introduction
Confirming a trend started with the Gebhard judgment,1 and consistently
with its case law on free movement of capital,2 the Court in Caixa-Bank held
that a non-discriminatory rule prohibiting remuneration on sight accounts is
an unjustified barrier to the freedom of establishment. Even though the rul-
ing is consistent with the previous broad interpretation given to the free
movement provisions, the case is exemplary of the issues arising once a su-
pranational court decides to substitute its own judgment for that of the com-
petent regulator. Thus, in just twenty-four paragraphs and with no market
analysis, the Court is satisfied that the rule is a barrier to market access, and
that, even though the rule “is indeed suitable for encouraging medium and
long-term saving”, it is not justified. No consideration is given to the fact
that regulation in a field as complex as the banking sector, where the con-
sumer might be particularly vulnerable, is informed by complex policy
choices, and might pursue welfare as well as economic aims. Once more
then the Court has decided to substitute its own judgment for that of the na-
tional regulator in relation to measures which did not discriminate against
foreign undertakings; this time however it is not clear that the Court’s assess-
ment strikes the correct balance between market deregulation and consumer
protection.
1. Cf. Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di
Milano, [1995] ECR I-4165; Case C-108/96, D Mc Quen et al v. Grandivision Belgium SA,
[2001] ECR I-837; C-294/00, Deutsche Paracelsus Schulen für Naturheilverfaharen GmbH v.
K Gräbner, [2002] ECR I-6515; Case C-79/01, Payroll Data Services (Italy) et al, [2002] ECR
I-8923.
2. See e.g. the “golden shares” cases, Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, [2002] ECR
I-4732; Case C-483/99, Commission v. France, [2002] ECR I-4781; Case C-503/99, Commis-
sion v. Belgium, [2002] ECR I-4809; Case C-98/01, Commission v. UK (BAA golden share),
[2003] ECR I-4641.
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2. Factual background and Advocate General Tizzano’s Opinion
Caixa-Bank, a French subsidiary of a Spanish bank, was prohibited by the
French committee for banking regulation from marketing a “sight” account
bearing a 2 percent interest on balances of EUR 1500 or more, since French
law provided that sight accounts may not be remunerated.3 Caixa-Bank ap-
pealed to the Conseil d’État arguing inter alia that such rules conflicted with
Article 43 EC, as interpreted in the Kraus, Gebhard and Pfeiffer rulings.4
The Conseil d’État referred the case to the European Court of Justice enquir-
ing as to the compatibility of such rules with the freedom of establishment,
and on the existence of possible justifications.
Mr Tizzano started by noting that, contrary to what was argued by the
Commission, the Codified Banking Directive (2000/12)5 was not relevant
since its mutual recognition regime applies only to branches (i.e. offices
without autonomous legal personality), and not to subsidiaries, which – hav-
ing legal personality – are in principle subject to the control and authoriza-
tion procedures of the host State.6 He then turned to analyse the consistency
of the French rules at issue with Article 43 EC. The main matter debated by
the parties was whether a measure might fall within the scope of the Treaty
for the sole reason that it discourages the pursuit of an economic activity; or
whether a discriminatory effect or at least an effect on the ability to take up
an activity (a direct market access barrier) is necessary. Mr Tizzano ac-
knowledged that, given the confusing state of the law in the field of free
movement of persons, both interpretations were possible. He then proceeded
3. For an interesting assessment of the EU banking market see Lahusen, Bank performance
in Europe: great progress through consolidation – except in Germany, EU Monitor (Deutsche
Bank Research), Financial Market Special, 28 June 2004, issue no. 13, www.dbresearch.com/
PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000175992.pdf
4. Case C-19/92, D Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg, [1993] ECR I-1663; Gebhard, su-
pra note 1; Case C-255/97, Pfeiffer Großhandel GmbH v. Löwa Warenhandel GmbH, [1999]
ECR I-2835.
5. Directive 2000/12, relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institu-
tions, O.J. 2000, L 126/1; the Commission has now proposed some amendments to the Direc-
tive, see Proposal for Re-casting Directive 2000/12 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 20 March 2000, relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institu-
tions, and Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993, on the capital adequacy of invest-
ment firms and credit institutions, COM(2004)486 final. For an evaluation of the Codified
Banking Directive see Alpa “The Harmonization of EC Law of Financial Markets in the Per-
spective of Consumer Protection”, 15 EBL Rev. (2004), 347.
6. For a critical appraisal of the conflict of laws problems which might derive from the
regime set out by the Directive, see Dassesse “Banking Secrecy after the Der Weduwe Case:
An Obstacle to the Free Movement of Cross-Border Banking Services”, 7 EC Tax Journal
(2003/4), 49.
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to suggest an analytical framework capable, in his opinion, of explaining
most of the case law. He argued that the rulings in Kraus, Gebhard, McQuen
and Payroll7 involved national measures which “directly restricted access to
a regulated profession by means that were potentially discriminatory”.8 He
admitted that the ruling in Pfeiffer9 could lend some authority to Caixa-
Bank’s submission that mere discouragement of the exercise of Article 43
EC rights is enough to trigger the Treaty. In that case, the Court had found
that a national rule prohibiting the use of a certain trade name because of the
risk of confusion with the name used by a competitor was a restriction on
freedom of establishment. The Advocate General then turned to other case
law to support his view that the Treaty prohibits only measures that “directly
impede the taking up of an economic activity or are by nature substantially
discriminatory because they do not ensure equal conditions both in law and
in fact as regards the taking up and pursuit of an economic activity”.10 As
authority for his view he relied in particular on the Alpine and Graf cases.11
In Alpine, the Court found that the rule at issue – a ban on cold-calling for
financial service providers which applied regardless of the domicile of the
prospective client – was caught by Article 49 EC because it “directly af-
fected access” to other Member States’ markets.12 In Graf, the Court found
that a rule which provided compensation for termination of an employment
contract only in the case of unjustified dismissal and not in the case of vol-
untary resignation, was not caught by the Treaty as it did not “affect access
of workers to the labour market”.13
Mr Tizzano then concluded that he had difficulties in finding that mea-
sures which merely reduce the attractiveness of pursuing an economic activ-
ity should be, for that sole reason, considered barriers to movement. To say
so, he argued, would conflict with the system of allocation of powers set out
in the Treaty; in the absence of harmonization Member States should be
7. Kraus, supra note 4; Gebhard, supra note 1; Mc Quen, supra note 1 ; Payroll Data
Services, supra note 1.
8. Opinion, para 38, emphasis added. Mr Tizzano did not explain why in his opinion the
measures at issue in those cases were potentially discriminatory. Whilst the rules in Kraus had
a discriminatory effect on movers, it is more difficult to understand how the rules at issue in the
other cases could have a potential discriminatory effect.
9. Case C-255/97, Pfeiffer Großhandel GmbH v. Löwa Warenhandel GmbH, [1999] ECR I-
2835.
10. Opinion, para 47, emphasis in the original.
11. Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financiën, [1995] ECR I-1141;
Case C-190/98, V Graf v. Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH, [2000] ECR I-437.
12. Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financiën, [1995] ECR I-1141,
para 28.
13. Case C-190/98, V Graf v. Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH, [2000] ECR I-437, para 23.
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able, in principle, to regulate the pursuit of economic activity in a non-dis-
criminatory manner; otherwise economic operators would be able to chal-
lenge any national measure on the sole grounds that it narrows their profit
margin. If that were the case the Treaty would be construed as establishing a
market in which rules are prohibited as a matter of principle (subject to justi-
fication), rather than just a single market where operators can move freely.
Therefore, only discriminatory measures and measures which directly affect
market access should fall within the scope of the Treaty.
Having set out his views on the appropriate scope of the Treaty, Advocate
General Tizzano turned to assess the compatibility with Article 43 EC of the
prohibition of remuneration for sight accounts. In his opinion those rules
would be caught only if directly discriminatory, or aimed at regulating access
to the banking market; or if they discriminated in fact or constituted a direct
obstacle to access to the banking market in view of their effects. He found
that since the French legislation at issue was neither directly discriminatory
nor intended to regulate access to the banking market it was necessary to ex-
amine the effect of the national rules. Whilst Mr Tizzano found that this was
an issue of substance reserved to the national court, he sought to provide
guidance as to how such an assessment should be conducted. In his opinion,
before finding that the rule was caught by Article 43 EC, the national court
should assess whether the effect of the rule prevented subsidiaries of foreign
banks from “competing effectively” with banks traditionally established in
the national territory. Thus, an investigation would be necessary as to
whether it would be possible for banks to raise their capital through other
forms of deposits which could be remunerated freely and thus compete ef-
fectively among themselves. If that were not the case, it would be more diffi-
cult for foreign banks to raise capital than French banks, which enjoy an
advantageous position in the deposit’s market through their large branch net-
works, and therefore there would be a discriminatory effect. Furthermore, in
this case, the rules at issue would deprive foreign banks of the “only effective
means of acquiring customers” in the French market, thereby directly imped-
ing access to the French banking market.14 Mr Tizzano then analysed the
French Government’s contention that such rules were in any event justified
by the need to protect the consumer: the rule aimed, it was argued, at main-
taining basic banking services free of charge, thus encouraging medium and
long term saving and curbing inflation. He found that whilst the aim of the
rules was indeed compatible with Community law, their effect was not pro-
portionate. A less restrictive means to achieve the same aim would be to fix
14. Opinion, para 89, emphasis added.
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a maximum ceiling on interest rates for sight accounts,15 so as to encourage
medium and long term saving; and to offer an alternative to consumers be-
tween non-interest bearing sight accounts with free banking services, and, if
necessary, interest bearing accounts with fee-paying banking services. There-
fore, Mr Tizzano concluded that if such rules constituted a barrier to the free-
dom of establishment, they would not be justified.
3. The Court’s ruling
Partially following Mr Tizzano’s analysis, the Court held that the measures at
stake were unjustified restrictions to the freedom of establishment. After
having found that Directive 2000/12 was not relevant, it repeated a familiar
formula according to which all measures “which prohibit, impede or render
less attractive” the exercise of the freedom of establishment are caught by
Article 43 EC.16 It then found that the rules at issue constituted “a serious
obstacle” to the pursuit of banking activity of companies from other Member
States through subsidiaries in France, “affecting their access to the market”,
and therefore were a restriction within the meaning of Article 43 EC.17 To
substantiate this finding, the Court followed Mr Tizzano’s line of reasoning,
although it made the assessment of the existence of both obstacle and justifi-
cation itself, rather than leaving it to the Conseil d’État. The Court found
that such rules would deprive foreign companies “of the possibility of com-
peting more effectively” with domestic institutions which have an extensive
network of branches.18 Where subsidiaries of foreign credit institutions seek
to enter the market, “competing by means of the rate of remuneration paid
on sight accounts constitutes one of the most effective methods to that end.
Access to the market by those establishments is thus made more difficult by
such a prohibition”.19 The Court then analysed the French Government’s
contention that there were other means for banks to compete, such as the 15-
days accounts which could be remunerated. However, the Court found that
since those accounts did not allow for the use of cheques or bankcards, they
could not remedy the hindrance caused by the prohibition of remuneration
15. In fact this was what the French rule did: it provided for a maximum ceiling on remu-
neration for sight accounts and accounts for less than 5 years, to be fixed by the committee for
Banking and Financial Regulation or the Minister responsible for the economy. The ceiling for
sight accounts was then fixed at 0%.
16. Para 11.
17. Para 12.
18. Para 13, emphasis added.
19. Para 14, emphasis added.
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on sight accounts. Turning to the justification of the measure, the Court held
that even “supposing” that maintaining basic banking services free of charge
might present certain benefits for the consumer, the rules went beyond what
was necessary. In the Court’s opinion, the choice could be left to the con-
sumer to decide between remunerated sight accounts with fee-paying baking
services, and non-remunerated accounts free of charge. Lastly, examining the
French contention that the measure was also aimed at encouraging long and
mid-term saving, the Court found that even though such rule was “indeed
suitable for encouraging medium and long term saving, it nevertheless
remain[ed] a measure which [went] beyond what is necessary to attain that
objective”.20
4. Analysis
In Caixa-Bank the Court did not take on board Mr Tizzano’s suggestion to
delimit the scope of Article 43 EC, instead restating the familiar Gebhard
formula. Once again it therefore refused to reduce the scope of the free
movement of persons provisions to a more manageable size. If the Court
seems to endorse a market access test, it is a very different test than that sug-
gested by scholarship and Advocates General;21 it is a test which fails to de-
fine the outer limits of the persons provisions, thus potentially allowing
scrutiny of any measure regulating an economic activity. Furthermore, in
this, as in many cases before, the Court clearly indicated its willingness to
act as the watchdog of the way national authorities choose to exercise their
discretion in the economic field. Thus it directly assessed the effect and pro-
portionality of the rules under scrutiny rather than follow Mr Tizzano’s sug-
gestion that such an assessment should be left to the national court. Whilst,
20. Para 23. The Conseil d’Etat subsequently (23 Feb. 2005) found in favour of Caixa-
Bank and unusually ordered damages to be paid; as a result the French legislation was amended
in March 2005 to reflect the rulings of the ECJ and the Conseil d’Etat, cf. Le Monde, “Le
Conseil d’Etat entérine la rémunération des comptes courants”, 23 Feb. 2005.
21. Cf e.g. A.G Jacobs’ Opinion in Case C-412/93, Société d’importation Éduard Leclerc-
Siplec v. TF1 Publicité SA, [1995] ECR I-179; A.G. Fennelly’s Opinion in Case C-190/98, V
Graf v. Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH, [2000] ECR I-437; A.G. Poiares Maduro’s Opinion
in Case C-446/03, Marks and Spencer plc v. David Halsey (HM Inspector of Taxes), Opinion
delivered on 7 April 2005, case pending, nyr; Weatherill, “After Keck: some thoughts on how
to clarify the clarification” 33 CML Rev. (1996), 885; Barnard “Fitting the remaining pieces
into the goods and persons jigsaw?” 26 EL Rev. (2001), 34. See also the Commission’s and
Member States’ pleadings in Case C-190/98, V Graf v. Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH,
[2000] ECR I-437 and Case C-176/96, Jiry Lehtonen, Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine
ASBL v. Fédération Royale Belge des Sociétés de Basket-ball ASBL, [2000] ECR I-2681.
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then, the case does not depart from previous case law on the free movement
of persons, some perplexities might arise from the way in which the Court
conducts its assessment of both effect and justification of the rules. This an-
notation will consider three main issues: first, the implications of the Court’s
reasoning on existing case law; secondly, the way the Court carries out the
justification assessment; and thirdly, the way the broad approach to the free
movement provisions affects not only the regulatory competence of the
Member States, but also the Community’s regulatory competence as well as
the way such competence might be exercised.
4.1. The effect of the rules
Once again the Court embraced an overly broad definition of a barrier fall-
ing within the scope of freedom of establishment. And one could well be in-
clined to speculate whether this is not a deliberate policy choice to hasten the
pace of integration by putting pressure on the Member States to harmonize
business rules.22 After all, commentators have already noted that the expan-
sion of the free movement provisions often coincided with a desire to ac-
tively encourage the adoption of rules at Community level,23 since in many
fields the ambitions of a common market are better met by providing inter-
State operators with a single regulatory framework. But it could also be ar-
gued that the Court’s perception of its role and of the European economic
constitution has evolved to impose a general proportionality scrutiny of mea-
sures regulating the market place (and even of many rules which have little if
anything to do with the market).24 In any case, whatever the reasons which
led the Court to embrace, once again, such a broad interpretation of Article
43 EC, it is necessary to assess the implications of the ruling here noted, and
to ask oneself whether some of the earlier case law still stands. In particular,
it should be queried whether one of the effects of the expansion of the mate-
rial scope of the free movement of persons provisions, and especially of Ar-
22. Cf. the disagreements surrounding the Commission’s proposal for the Services Direc-
tive (COM(2004)2 final/3); see the press release issued after the Brussels European Council
(22–23 March 2005) of 23 March 2005; the Council found a compromise between those who
opposed the proposed directive for fear of social dumping (e.g. France and Germany) and those
who favoured it in the name of liberalization (e.g. the UK). www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/com-
muniques/2005/03/22conseurserv/index.html. But see the critical draft report of the European
Parliament (2004)/0001 (COD).
23. E.g. Weatherill, “After Keck: some thoughts on how to clarify the clarification”, 33
CML Rev. (1996), 885, esp. 906.
24. Cf. Spaventa, “From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a (non-)Economic European
Constitution”, 41 CML Rev. (2004), 743.
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ticles 43 and 49 EC, is not to neutralize the compromise between internal
market and domestic regulatory competences reached in Keck.25
In Keck, the Court accepted that some trading rules (certain selling ar-
rangements) fall in principle within the regulatory competence of the Mem-
ber States, and should therefore not be scrutinized as to their necessity and
proportionality unless directly or indirectly discriminatory.26 The same ap-
proach was adopted in Semeraro Casa Uno,27 where the Court found that
Sunday trading rules fell outside the scope of Article 43 EC since they were
not discriminatory; their purpose was not to “regulate the establishment” of
undertakings; and any effect they had on the freedom of establishment was
too uncertain and indirect to constitute a barrier relevant for Article 43 EC
purposes. However, if the thrust of the ruling in Caixa-Bank were to be fol-
lowed, then this type of rules would no longer be shielded from the propor-
tionality assessment demanded by the application of the free movement
provisions, and the balancing exercise would be relocated from the hands of
the legislature to those of the judiciary.28
This is the case since in Caixa-Bank the Court failed to follow Mr
Tizzano’s opinion in one important respect. Mr Tizzano instructed the na-
tional court to determine whether the prohibition on remuneration prevented
foreign subsidiaries from competing effectively, or whether there were other
“significant” ways to compete. Thus, he implicitly accepted that in order for
a rule to fall within the scope of the Treaty, it is not enough that it should
restrict one way of competing; rather, to be caught by Article 43 EC, the rule
must deprive the new market entrant of “the” effective way of competing.
This analysis is comparable to, and compatible with, the approach adopted
by the Court in relation to advertising bans in the context of the free move-
ment of goods: whilst a total ban on advertising might be considered as in-
25. Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91, Keck and Mithouard, [1993] ECR I-6097.
26. Following the ruling in Case C-405/98, Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v. Gourmet
International Products AB (GIP), [2001] ECR I-1795 it could have been argued that selling
arrangements which totally prevent market access would also be caught (regardless of dis-
crimination). However, in Case C-322/01, Deutscher Apothekerverband eV v. 0800 DocMorris
NV, Jacques Waterval, judgment of 11 Dec. 2003, nyr, the Court returned to a purely discrimi-
natory assessment. This said, Case C-239/02 Douwe Egberts NV v. Westrom Pharma NV,
Christophe Souranis and Douwe Egberts NV v. FICS-World BVBA, judgment of 15 July 2004,
is slightly confusing on the matter.
27. Joined Cases C-418–421/93, Semeraro Casa Uno et al. v. Sindaco del Comune di Er-
busco et al., [1996] ECR I-2975.
28. The fact that Semeraro concerned a domestic supermarket is immaterial, as it played no
role in the reasoning of the Court – which did not exclude the application of Art. 43 EC for that
reason, but rather because the effect of the rules was too uncertain and indirect for them to be
qualified as a barrier falling within the scope of the freedom of establishment.
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herently discriminatory because of the difficulties that new brands encounter
in penetrating the market,29 a ban on just one way of advertising needs to be
scrutinized as to its effects before being caught by Article 28 EC.30
In Caixa-Bank, however, the Court declared the rules at issue as falling
within the scope of the Treaty without carrying out any factual assessment.
Instead, it considered it as a self-evident truth that remuneration on sight ac-
counts was “one of the most effective” ways to compete for subsidiaries of
foreign banks, and was therefore a barrier to the freedom of establishment.
In order to justify this statement the Court referred to the fact that existing
credit institutions have an extensive network of branches which allows them
greater opportunities to raise capital from the public.
Unless the ruling is confined to the facts of the case, it might therefore be
interpreted as authority to hold that any rule restricting effective ways of
competing is caught by the Treaty prohibition and needs to be justified, at
least when existing market actors benefit of an extensive retail network
which is usually not immediately available to new market entrants. If this
were true, the ruling at issue would overrule previous rulings and in particu-
lar the ruling in Semeraro Casa Uno. There are then two closely related is-
sues that deserve analysis in relation to the Court’s assessment of the effect
of the rules: first, whether the Court’s reasoning is convincing; secondly, the
implications of such reasoning for future case law. In other words, are rules
which restrict the way undertakings compete with each other now caught by
the Treaty regardless of any legal or factual discrimination?
4.1.1. “One of the most effective ways to compete”
As said above, the Court held that remuneration on sight accounts can be
construed as a barrier to the freedom of establishment since it is one of the
most effective ways for subsidiaries of foreign banks to compete with do-
mestic banks. However, no empirical evidence is referred to in order to sup-
port the statement that this is actually the case. Sight accounts are mainly
used for everyday transactions, not for investment/savings purposes; the bal-
ance on those accounts fluctuates continuously thus making earnings from
interest not very significant. In the case of banking services, it is difficult to
imagine that the very low interest rates paid on small balances are crucial to
consumers’ choices (whilst the higher interest rates paid on mid and long
term accounts, allowed by the French legislation, might well bear more im-
29. Gourmet, cited supra note 26.
30. E.g. Joined Cases C-34–36/95, Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v. De Agostini
(Svenska) Förlag AB v. TV Shop I Sverige AB, [1997] ECR I-3843; Case C-71/02, H Karner
Industries-Auktionen GmbH v. Troostwijk GmbH, judgment of 25 March 2004, nyr.
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pact on consumers’ preferences).31 Exception given for internet banking
which usually grants a more generous rate of remuneration, the interest rates
on sight accounts, where any remuneration is given at all, vary across Europe
between 0.25 percent and 2 percent, and most banks require minimum de-
posits before remunerating the account.32 Take the example of the UK where
remuneration is allowed: on balances up to £ 1999, the interest rate of high
street banks varies from a meagre 0.1 percent to a hardly more generous 0.5
percent. A customer who left £ 1999 in her account without withdrawing any
money for a year would therefore earn between, £ 1.90 and, £ 9.50 – it seems
rather unlikely that the prospect of such generous earnings is a determinant
factor in the consumers’ choice of bank.
Furthermore, even should remuneration on sight accounts be considered
an effective way to compete, it is by no means the only nor the most effective
one. Banks can as effectively compete on interest rates on mid and long term
accounts, customer service, advantageous conditions on related products
(e.g. mortgages, insurance policies, exchange rates, investment services),
and prices on fee paying services. It therefore seems that the Court effec-
tively construed a limitation on one way to compete (regardless of its effec-
tiveness) as a barrier to market access falling for that sole reason within the
scope of the Treaty.33 The qualification of a rule regulating a way to compete
as a per se restriction on market access relevant for the purposes of the free
movement provisions means that the notion of market access is so broadly
construed that almost any rule can be qualified as a barrier. As in other re-
cent cases relating to the freedom of establishment, in this case it was the
very existence of the rules which created a barrier (if a barrier were indeed
there),34 not its application to a foreign company. In other words, there was
31. The European average remuneration for sight accounts is a mere 0.21% (source Le
Monde, “Légalisée en mars, la rémunération des comptes bancaires ne devrait pas bouleverser
les pratiques”, 10 Feb. 2005). Interest rates on sight accounts offered in the UK vary usually
between 0.1 to 1.15% on sums up to £ 10,000; by comparing the rates offered by high street
banks it seems that the UK based banks are not very eager to compete on interest rates on
current accounts. This is so much so that, for instance, Barclays Bank does not even mention its
interest rates for current accounts in its website.
32. Source Le Monde, “Légalisée en mars, la rémunération des comptes bancaires ne
devrait pas bouleverser les pratiques”, 10 Feb. 2005.
33. Furthermore, the fact that the restriction of one way to compete can be defined as a
barrier relevant for free movement purposes seems also at odds with the Court’s finding in
Case C-376/98, Germany v. European Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising), [2000]
ECR I-8419, that a restriction of a form of competition is not tantamount to a distortion of
competition (cf. esp. para 113).
34. Cf. White, “In Search of the Limits to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty”, 26 CML Rev.
(1989), 235, esp at 246; A.G. Tesauro’s Opinion in Case C-292/92, Hünermund and Others v.
Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg, [1993] ECR I-6787; and Spaventa, op. cit. su-
pra note 24.
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no intra-Community specificity to the case at stake, as any new market en-
trant, regardless of its country of incorporation, would have faced the same
ordeal in penetrating the French market.
Finally, the fact that rules merely regulating one way of competing fall
now, for that sole reason, within the scope of Article 43 EC is at odds with
the Semeraro approach.35 Take by way of example rules prohibiting retailers
from opening at night and on Sundays (similar to those at issue in Semeraro
itself). There can be no doubt that one way to compete (and, intuitively, quite
an effective one) for a supermarket wishing to enter a new market would be
to open 24 hours a day 7 days a week, as it would attract a niche of consum-
ers (night-workers, people who work long hours) who might not be catered
for if opening hours are restricted. Under pre-Caixa-Bank case law such
rules would not have constituted a restriction on the freedom of establish-
ment and would have escaped scrutiny altogether. However, following the
judgment in Caixa-Bank, such rules – by making it more difficult for new
market entrants to compete with established operators, who naturally have an
inherent competitive advantage since already present on the territory and
known to the consumers – could be construed as a barrier to market access
in need of scrutiny. Thus, as we have seen in other fields and especially in
relation to advertisement,36 rules which were deemed in Keck to be, lacking
harmonization, within the regulatory competence of the Member States,
might now well fall within the scope of the Treaty and demand a proportion-
ality assessment. It would be legitimate then to ask oneself, or the Court,
what was the point of Keck?
4.2. The justification of the rules
Critical as one might be about the Court’s qualification of the rules at issue
as barriers to the freedom of establishment, it is difficult to be surprised. I
35. One could also argue that the rules at issue in the case here noted were comparable to
restriction on prices which, in the case of goods, have been qualified as selling arrangements
and, even in the dark years of the Sunday trading cases, have been subjected to scrutiny only
insofar as discriminatory or protectionist in their effects, e.g. Case 65/75, Tasca, [1976] ECR
291; Case 229/83, Association des Centres distributeurs Edouard Leclerc and others v. SARL
‘Au ble vert’ and others, [1985] ECR 1; and post-Keck, Case C-63/94, Groupement National
des Négociants en Pommes de Terre de Belgique (Belgapom) v. ITM Belgium SA and Vocarex
SAi, [1995] ECR I-2467.
36. Rules on advertising constitute a selling arrangement falling outside the scope of Art.
28 EC unless discriminatory and possibly if totally preventing market access; however, rules
on advertising also fall within Art. 49 EC (unless totally ancillary to the sale of goods, cf. Case
C-71/02, H Karner Industries-Auktionen GmbH v. Troostwijk GmbH, judgment of 25 March
2004, nyr) and are therefore usually scrutinized under that provision regardless of discrimina-
tion. See e.g. De Agostini, cited supra note 34, and Gourmet, cited supra note 26.
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have argued previously in this journal that there is mounting evidence that
the Court is willing to scrutinize almost any rule regulating an economic ac-
tivity, and the ruling in Caixa-Bank is no exception.37 However, market rules
reflect policy choices which in some cases, as in this one, might well be
rather complex, pursuing a number of different objectives ranging from eco-
nomic policy to consumer protection and welfare choices. Once the link be-
tween obstacle to movement and rule falling within the scope of the Treaty is
de facto severed (although maybe maintained in theory), one would expect a
very careful scrutiny of the justifications for rules which merely regulate
market behaviour. After all, lacking harmonization, those rules should fall
primarily within the scope of the Member States’ regulatory autonomy. It
should in fact be remembered that in the absence of any discrimination, it is
impossible for the Member States to have a double regulatory regime, one
for domestic operators and one for foreign ones. If rules such as qualifica-
tion requirements,38 capital requirements39 and so on, can be applied selec-
tively – i.e. to those who are wholly regulated by the host State but not to
those who are regulated elsewhere – this is not possible for non-discrimina-
tory market regulation. In the absence of discrimination/double burden, a
finding of incompatibility with the Treaty means that the rule has to disap-
pear from the statute books, as it would be impossible to have a dual regula-
tory regime for companies established and subject to the regulatory regime
of the same country on the sole grounds that one is a subsidiary of a com-
pany incorporated elsewhere whilst the other is not. Thus, in such cases, a
finding of incompatibility deprives the Member States of the ability to regu-
late their market place in that particular manner.40
For this reason, one would expect some caution on the part of the Court.
And there might be some merit in arguing that a committee of experts is bet-
ter placed than a supranational court to strike, if not the “right” balance be-
tween conflicting policy aims, at least a reasonable one. It is all the more
striking then that the Court would devote so very little attention to assessing
the proportionality of the rules at stake. In justifying its measures, the French
Government relied on two policy aims: first of all, the prohibition on remu-
neration on sight accounts was aimed at ensuring that basic banking services
37. Spaventa, op. cit. supra note 24.
38. E.g. Case C-340/89, I Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und Europa-
angelegenheiten Baden-Wüttemberg, [1991] ECR I-2357.
39. E.g. Case C-212/97, Centros ltd v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] ECR I-1459.
40. Unsurprisingly then, the French rules have been amended and remuneration for sight
accounts is now allowed for all credit institutions, cf. Le Monde Argent, “Comptes rémunérés:
un marché de dupes”, 27 Feb. 2005.
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would be free of charge; secondly, the rules were aimed at encouraging mid
and long term saving.
The Court was not persuaded. In relation to the first claim, it recognized
that consumers “might” benefit from free basic banking services. However,
it held that the rules were not proportionate since the choice between remu-
nerated fee paying accounts and non-remunerated free accounts could be left
to the consumer. There is no real analysis as to the effect of disposing of
such rule. Would market forces lead towards remunerated accounts with the
risk of the consumer not being able to choose between free and fee paying
accounts? And would the welfare/redistributive aims of the policy then be af-
fected? Low income consumers might well lose from fee paying/ remuner-
ated accounts as the relatively low balance on their account might mean that
the interest earned is less than the expenses incurred. On the other hand, high
earners might be better off. Moreover, even when remunerated accounts are
free of charge, they often come with some nasty ties such as hidden charges
or heavy penalties for overdrafts.41 Those would naturally affect the more
vulnerable consumers who might well be attracted by the prospect of earn-
ings which are in fact minimal, and end up facing unforeseen small print.
Secondly, in relation to the aim of encouraging mid and long term savings,
the Court simply stated that even though prohibiting remuneration for sight
accounts is “indeed suitable” to encourage savings, it “goes beyond what is
necessary to attain that objective”.42 No explanation is provided for this
statement. Mr Tizzano stated that it was “improbable” that there were no less
restrictive means to achieve the purported aim; he however left it to the na-
tional court to determine such issue as it could not be excluded that “circum-
stances [could] emerge or arguments [be] put forward” to justify such rules.
It is unfortunate that the Court did not follow suite.
4.3. The broader picture
It is clear that the interpretation of the free movement provisions is of consti-
tutional significance. Thus, the broader the scope of the Treaty, the more na-
tional policies can be subjected to the proportionality scrutiny demanded by
European law. But the partial loss of sovereignty deriving from a broad inter-
pretation of the free movement provisions is not the only constitutional effect
of negative integration. The definition of what constitutes an obstacle to free
41. Cf. the report published by Le Monde, “La plupart des consommateurs européens sont
mécontents”, 7 Oct. 2004, which was especially critical of the UK banking system for lack of
protection of consumers from banks unilaterally imposed charges.
42. Para 23.
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movement is also relevant in establishing or excluding harmonizing compe-
tence in relation to internal market competence.43 Wyatt has analysed this
problem in relation to the health care cases,44 pointing at how the expansion
of the scope of Article 49 EC to encompass also publicly funded medical ser-
vices might establish at least a partial harmonizing competence in the field
of health care despite the prohibition contained in Article 152 EC.45 Unless
the definition of obstacle to movement relevant for harmonizing purposes is
different from that adopted in relation to the free movement provisions, an
expansion of the scope of the Treaty determines also an expansion of the
regulatory competence enjoyed by the Community.
However, this is not the only effect that the Court’s case law might have on
the Community’s ability to regulate the market place; another problematic is-
sue might also derive from the very finding of disproportionality of a given
type of rules. In this respect it could be argued that once the notion of ob-
stacle to movement is broadened to encompass truly non-discriminatory
rules, a finding of disproportionality of a domestic rule has not only the ef-
fect of depriving the national authorities of their regulatory competence, but
also of curtailing the discretion of the Community institutions. In other
words, if and once a rule which prohibits remuneration on sight accounts has
been found by the ECJ to be disproportionate,46 it is not clear that a similar
rule adopted by the Community institutions could stand the proportionality
scrutiny without creating a fracture in the consistency of the Community le-
gal and constitutional system. It is worth analysing briefly this problem.
The outcome of the proportionality scrutiny varies according to the type
of rules at issue and the amount of discretion enjoyed by the institution
which has adopted the rule.47 In particular a finding of disproportionality of
43. Cf. Case C-376/98, Germany v. European Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertis-
ing), [2000] ECR I-8419.
44. Case C-157/99, B S M Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and Peerbooms v.
Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen, [2001] ECR I-5473; Case C-368/98, A Vanbraekel et
al. v. Alliance nationale des mutualités chrétiennes, [2001] ECR I-5363; C-385/99, V G
Müller-Fauré v. Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen U A and E E M van Riet v.
Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij Z A O Zorgverzekeringen, [2003] ECR I-4509; C-56/01,
Patricia Inizan v. Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie des Hauts de Seine, [2003] ECR I-
12403.
45. Wyatt “Community Competence to Regulate Medical Services” in Dougan and
Spaventa (Eds.), Social Welfare and EU Law (Hart Publishing 2005), p. 210. See also Snell,
“Who’s Got the Power? Free Movement and Allocation of Competences in EC Law”, 22 YEL
(2003), 323.
46. On the other hand a finding of non-proportionality made by a national court would not
be problematic for the Community legislature.
47. Cf. the extensive analysis by de Búrca, “The Principle of Proportionality and its Appli-
cation in EC Law”, 13 YEL (1993), 105.
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a rule creating an obstacle to movement at national level does not usually
curtail the discretion of the Community institutions to adopt exactly the
same rule, or even a more trade-restrictive rule, at Community level. Indeed,
in the scrutiny of Community legislative measures the Court is willing to
recognize the discretion of the political institutions and, refusing to substitute
its own judgment for that of the legislature, to limit its scrutiny to check that
the measure is not manifestly inappropriate to pursue its purported aim.48 On
the other hand, the scrutiny of national measures which create an obstacle to
free movement is more pervasive often encompassing a check as to whether
there are no less restrictive measures available.49 Thus, it is not surprising
that, normally, the Court’s finding of disproportionality of a national rule
should bear no relation to the assessment of a similar harmonized rule at
Community level.
Take for instance the example of rules applicable to posted workers: in
Mazzoleni, the Court indicated that to automatically require a company
which only occasionally and for short periods of time posted its workers in
another Member State to comply with that State’s minimum wage require-
ment might be disproportionate as it imposes a heavy administrative burden
on the company.50 On the other hand, Directive 96/71 on posted workers in
principle requires the employer to comply with the most favourable mini-
mum wage regime.51 Despite its finding in Mazzoleni, it is extremely un-
likely that the Court would find such Community legislative regime
disproportionate.52 The same reasoning applies for, for instance, composition
48. Cf. e.g. Case C-233/94, Germany v. Council and European Parliament (deposit guar-
antee scheme), [1997] ECR I-2405, esp. para 56; and more recently Case C-491/01, British
American Tobacco v. Secretary of State for Health, [2002] ECR I-11453, esp. para 123.
49. Cf. e.g. Payroll Data Services, supra note 1; Müller-Fauré, supra note 44. The Court
does not always perform the proportionality assessment, since the proportionality assessment
is often treated as a matter of fact reserved to the national court, see e.g. Gourmet, cited supra
note 26.
50. Case C-165/98, Mazzoleni and Inter Surveillance Assistance SARL, [2001] ECR I-
2189.
51. Directive 96/71, concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of
services, O.J. 1997, L 18/1. According to Art. 3(4), Member States might decide, together with
the relevant collective organizations, to exempt from such requirement purely occasional work
if its duration is less than one month over a year; however in the absence of such exemption the
harmonized regime introduced by the Directive applies.
52. But it cannot be excluded that the Court might be willing to adopt a Baumbast type
approach and impose upon national authorities a general proportionality requirement in apply-
ing the black letter of Community provisions, although this is probably more unlikely to hap-
pen in cases in which the application of such requirement would act to the detriment of workers
(even though the Court has left the door open to this possibility by stating that the Directive
codifies previous case law including the principle of proportionality, Case C-341/02, Commis-
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requirements for foodstuffs which very seldom survive the proportionality
assessment if imposed by national authorities, but which are often subject to
harmonizing legislation.53
The difference in the outcome of the proportionality assessment in those
cases can be easily explained having regard to two main reasons. First of all,
in the case of scrutiny of national rules, the situation or the product is al-
ready regulated by the home State, and therefore consumer and welfare con-
cerns have already been taken into due account by one of the legislatures.
Secondly, and more importantly, in the case of the free movement provisions
the two interests to be balanced are that of free movement and of the relevant
aim (which has usually already been considered once by the home State).
But in a harmonized regime, the free movement interest is guaranteed by the
very fact that the rules have been harmonized, and so the assessment of pro-
portionality needs to balance the relevant public interest vis-à-vis economic
freedom. It is not surprising then that the Court would recognize the legiti-
macy of political discretion and refuse to substitute its judgment for that of
the institutions.
This consistent framework however might well be subjected to undue
strain once the rules which are defined as obstacles do not affect in a spe-
cific way the intra-Community situation. In the ruling here noted, Caixa-
Bank would be regulated, as far as its transactions in France were concerned,
only by French legislation. The Spanish rules on remuneration of accounts
would not apply to the bank’s French subsidiaries. The regulatory compe-
tence lies, consistently with Directive 2000/12, with the French authorities.
In penetrating the French market Caixa-Bank would encounter exactly the
same difficulties as those faced by any new market entrant (regardless of
place of incorporation). The fact that Caixa Bank happened to be incorpo-
rated in Spain was rather immaterial to the effect of the rules on its ability to
successfully gain market shares.
If an obstacle to intra-Community movement is so broadly construed as
encompassing mere restrictions on the way in which an undertaking decides
sion v. Germany, judgment of 14 April 2005, nyr). Cf. Dougan and Spaventa, “Educating Rudy
and the (non-)English Patient: A double-bill on residency rights under Article 18 EC”, 28 EL
Rev. (2003), 699.
53. Consistent case law, e.g. Case 788/79, Gilli and Andres, [1980] ECR 2071; Case C-358/
95, T Morellato v. Unitá Sanitaria Locale 11 Pordenone, [1997] ECR I-1431; Case C-123/00,
C Bellamy and English Shop Wholesale SA, [2001] ECR I-2795. Several directives have been
adopted in relation to foodstuff (eg Directive 2000/36, relating to cocoa and chocolate products
intended for human consumption, O.J. 2000, L 197/19). The validity of the food supplements
directive (Directive 2002/46, O.J. 2002, L 183/51) has now been challenged inter alia in rela-
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to compete, the proportionality assessment will weight the undertaking’s in-
terest in choosing how to better pursue its market strategy with the public in-
terest invoked. Thus, without any discrimination, without any issue of double
burden, and without any cross-border specificity to the situation at stake, the
Court in its proportionality assessment necessarily has to take into account
(even though it might not say so explicitly) not the obstacle to movement vis-
à-vis the public interest invoked, but rather the restriction on the economic
operator’s freedom to trade vis-à-vis the public interest invoked. If this is so,
then it becomes more difficult to understand how the assessment of the pro-
portionality of a similar rule enacted by the Community rather than the na-
tional legislature could lead to a different result. After all, in assessing the
proportionality of Community legislative acts the Court would have to
weight exactly the same interests, i.e. economic freedom and consumer pro-
tection/economic policy objectives. Therefore, either the Court would have
to substitute its own assessment for that of the Community legislature or
there would be a fracture in the consistency of the system which would be
difficult to explain without accusing the Court of being biased in favour of
Community harmonizing rules. In this sense, the finding of disproportion-
ality of a national rule construed as an obstacle to movement might well cur-
tail the Community legislature’s discretion in pursuing the public interest as
it deems best.
5. Conclusions
The ruling in Caixa-Bank is consistent with the broad interpretation adopted
in the field of free movement of persons, and in many ways is a good ex-
ample of the problems which might arise when the legitimacy of non-dis-
criminatory market rules are assessed directly by the Court in a preliminary
ruling procedure, by nature inimical to complex fact finding exercises.54
This said, the reasoning of the Court is somewhat unsatisfactory – especially
the assessment of the justifications – leaving the reader with the uncomfort-
tion to its proportionality. See Joined Cases C-154 and C-155/04, Alliance for Natural Health
Nutri-Link Ltd v. Secretary of State for Health and The Queen National Association of Health
Stores Health Food Manufacturers Ltd v. Secretary of State for Health and National Assembly
for Wales, Opinion delivered on 5 April 2005, case still pending.
54. Cf. the conflicting findings reached in the Rioja cases: Case C-47/90, Etablissements
Delhaize Frères et Compagnie Le Lion SA v. Promalvin SA and AGE Bodegas Unidas SA,
[1992] ECR I-3669; and Case C-388/95, Belgium v. Spain (Rioja), [2000] ECR I-3123 anno-
tated by Spaventa, 38 CML Rev (2001) 211.
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able sensation that it is based on vague and intuitive rather than factual find-
ings. Once again market access is used as a trump card to dispose of rules
which are perceived as undue and unjustified restrictions on both the under-
takings ability to choose how best to pursue their economic activity, and on
the consumers’ possibility to choose from a range of different products. Not
only is it not clear that the balancing exercise performed by the Court is
more persuasive than that effectuated by the competent banking authorities,
but also, and more importantly, the constitutional effects of such findings
might be more pervasive than appears at first sight.
Eleanor Spaventa*
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